






<p><b>BOARD BRIEFING SUMMARY</b></p> <h1 style="margin: 0;">Water District Cybersecurity: What Your Board Needs to Know</h1> <p style="color: white; font-style: italic;">A one-page summary for district leadership and board members</p>	 <p><b>Steve "The Doctor" Meek</b>                  CISSP • CEO, Fulcrum Group                  817-337-0300</p>
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<p><b>70%+</b></p> <p>of water systems fail basic EPA cyber standards  <i>EPA Enforcement Alert, 2024</i></p>	<p><b>26.6M</b></p> <p>Americans served by systems with critical vulnerabilities  <i>EPA OIG Report, Nov 2024</i></p>	<p><b>\$43.5B</b></p> <p>at risk from a single day of water service disruption  <i>U.S. Water Alliance</i></p>
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### THE RISK: WHY YOUR DISTRICT IS A TARGET

	<b>You Must Stay Running</b>	Water systems cannot afford downtime. Attackers know this — it's exactly why they target utilities with ransomware.
	<b>Vendor Access Gaps</b>	Every integrator with an unmonitored connection is a potential entry point. Most districts have several.
	<b>Nation-State Threats</b>	Russian and Iranian actors have already attacked Texas water systems. This is documented, not theoretical.
	<b>Legacy OT Equipment</b>	Old PLCs and RTUs can't be patched like office PCs. They need compensating controls until replaced.
	<b>Phishing + Credentials</b>	88% of breaches involve stolen credentials. One compromised employee account can start the chain.

### 5 QUESTIONS EVERY BOARD MEMBER SHOULD BE ABLE TO ANSWER

1	What are our top 10 'must-not-fail' systems, and who is responsible for each?
2	Do we have MFA enforced for all users — especially anyone with admin access or vendor credentials?
3	When did we last test a restore of our SCADA or OT system backups?
4	Who decides to isolate our OT network during a cyber incident — and how fast can they do it?
5	Have we mapped every vendor with remote access to our systems and confirmed those paths are monitored?

### THE 6 ACTIONS YOUR TEAM SHOULD COMPLETE IN THE NEXT 90 DAYS

#	Action	Target Window
1	Map and reduce internet exposure — especially OT-facing assets	Days 1–15
2	Inventory and standardize all vendor remote access methods	Days 1–15
3	Build your OT asset inventory starting with internet-connected devices	Days 16–45

<b>4</b>	Validate IT/OT segmentation and apply 'deny by default' zone policies	<b>Days 16–45</b>
<b>5</b>	Test OT/SCADA backup restoration and document the process	<b>Days 46–90</b>
<b>6</b>	Run a tabletop exercise simulating SCADA disruption + vendor coordination	<b>Days 46–90</b>


### Want to bring this to your board with confidence?

The Fulcrum Group offers a FREE, confidential Water District Cyber Readiness Conversation. We'll work through these six actions with you, identify your highest-risk gaps, and give you a clear starting point — no pressure, no jargon, no IT jerks.

 **817-337-0300**



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